



















Right through the boom years prior to 2001, the U.S. economy was facing a strategic predicament—
to which attention was repeatedly drawn in a series of papers emanating from the Levy Institute—in
that the main engine of growth (credit-financed private expenditure) was unsustainable,from which
it followed that the whole stance of fiscal policy would have to be radically changed if the New
Economy were not to become stagnant. The experience of the last two years has partially vindicated
the Levy Institute view. The boom was indeed broken because, as predicted, private expenditure fell
relative to income. The potentially dire effects on the level of activity, however, were mitigated by a
transformation in the stance of fiscal policy, accompanied by a radical change in attitudes toward
budget deficits, which suddenly became respectable. The expansionary fiscal policy initiated by
President George W.Bush was reinforced by a further aggressive relaxation of monetary policy so that
(real) short-term interest rates have fallen almost to zero, thereby giving the consumer boom a last
gasp.Yet, with all this help, the recovery from the recession of 2001 has not been robust. Growth has
generally been below that of productive potential, and there is a widespread sense that all is not well.
This analysis argues that a new strategic predicament is on the horizon as a result of the excep-
tionally large and growing balance of payments deficit, to which the public discussion attaches very
little importance. In his testimony to Congress on the state of the economy (February 11, 20032),
Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan made no reference whatever to the balance of payments. The mod-
els embodying the “New Macroeconomics” that have suddenly become so influential3 do not even
contain a foreign sector or any representation of stocks of foreign debt that the United States is 
now rapidly accumulating. The Economic Report of the President (ERP, 2003, chapter 1, pp.59–62,
w3.access.gpo.gov/eop/index.html) has a section on the balance of payments but considers that 
the deficit has no immediate policy implications, on the grounds that the cost of servicing U.S. net 
foreign liabilities is negligible.
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The central argument of this analysis can be simply
stated. The primary balance of payments4 in the fourth quar-
ter of 2002 was equal to about 5 percent of GDP—easily a
postwar record. If, as all official documents assume, the U.S.
economy grows fast enough during the next six years to gen-
erate some reduction in unemployment, there is a presump-
tion that the primary balance will deteriorate further, to at
least 6.4 percent, causing U.S. foreign debt to rise to nearly 
$8 trillion or 60 percent of GDP. And if, as the ERP assumes,
the stance of monetary policy reverts to neutral so that short-
term interest rates rise to 4.3 percent, the net flow of interest
payments out of the country could well rise to $200 to $300
billion per annum, thereby raising the deficit in the overall
balance of payments to about 8.5 percent of GDP. As the 
private sector’s financial deficit is likely to revert toward its
usual state of surplus,it follows as a matter of accounting logic
that the government would have to run a deficit at least as
large as the balance of payments deficit—that is, the budget
deficit would have to rise from some 3 percent of GDP as now 
projected for 2003 to perhaps 9 to 10 percent of GDP in
2007–2008. For a number of reasons this is not a credible 
scenario—if only because such a position would not itself be
a stable one; the rate at which foreign debt would be accumu-
lating would be such as to generate a further,accelerating,flow
of interest payments out of the country, requiring even larger
budget deficits in subsequent years.
The default conclusion is that the U.S. economy will not
recover properly in the medium term, but rather will enter a
prolonged period of “growth recession.”The only lasting solu-
tion will be to get U.S.exports to rise much faster than imports
over a prolonged period. But how is this to be achieved?
Whatever the politics of the matter, there was no technical
obstacle to changing fiscal policy;all that was needed were new
tax schedules and public expenditure authorisations.Any pol-
icy to generate an adequate expansion of net export demand
will likely encounter far more intractable obstacles.
MORE PRECISELY
It is well known to students of the National Accounts that the
surplus of private disposable income over expenditure is
equal to the government balance (written as a deficit) plus the
current balance of payments (written as a surplus).5 While
these balances are related to one another by a system of
accounting identities, each has, to some extent, a life of its
own that is reconciled with the other two via the aggregate
income flow. The way the balances evolve provides a useful
armature around which to organise a narrative account of
economic developments, because any one of them is neces-
sarily implied by the other two. Furthermore, the balances
may give an early warning that unsustainable processes are
taking place,for any high or rising balance implies a change in
public, private, or foreign debts, which cannot grow without
limit relative to income.
Chart 1 shows how the three financial balances have
moved, relative to GDP, since 1960. Vertical lines mark the
points at which the ’90s boom really started (at the beginning
of 1992) and when it came to an end (in the third quarter of
2000). The chart shows how the configuration of balances
during the ’90s was quite unlike anything that had happened
before. It illustrates6 how the boom took place notwithstand-
ing strong contractionary forces from the government’s fiscal
stance and also from net export demand; and hence how the
expansion of aggregate demand was driven by an unprece-
dented growth of private expenditure relative to income.
By the end of the boom, private expenditure was far in excess
of disposable income,an excess made possible by a huge accu-
mulation of debt, by both the personal sector and corpora-
tions. The turning point came in the second half of 2000,
when (and because) private expenditure started to fall back
relative to income. Deprived of what had been its motor 
during the previous eight years, the economy would have suf-
fered a severe recession had the government not stepped in
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with a series of stimulatory fiscal packages. The private sector 
balance reverted toward its historical mean (a substantial 
surplus), but the pace at which this happened slowed down
during 2002 because a reduction in interest rates—to levels
not seen for 40 years—encouraged households to borrow
huge sums of money and spend the proceeds. But dis-
turbingly,the balance of payments continued its deterioration
apace through 2001–2002, almost impervious to the brief
recession and subsequent period of weak growth.
THE NEW STRATEGIC PROBLEM
Chart 2 does not contain a forecast. It shows what we believe
to be the true implications of the growth path for the econ-
omy, which is mapped out in the Economic Report of the
President and is designed to show what can’t happen, rather
than what will.
The assumptions underlying this chart are as follows.It is
assumed, in line with the projections in the ERP, that the
economy grows at an average rate of 3.3 percent between now
and 2008. This is the growth rate considered necessary to
bring the unemployment rate down slightly from 5.7 to 5 per-
cent,and we have no reason to disagree with it as a conditional
prediction. With such a growth rate, we have taken the view
that, provided there is no major devaluation of the dollar, the
primary balance of payments will certainly not improve and
will likely deteriorate,at least to some extent,over the next five
or six years. It has to be emphasised, and this is not just cow-
ardly caution,that our prediction may turn out to be incorrect
if there is another major revision to the statistics. In an earlier
study,7 we made a careful projection of the U.S. balance of
trade, not entirely dissimilar to the one presented here, which
was largely nullified, or at least set back three or four years, by
a huge revision to the historical figures,which showed that the
balance had deteriorated much less, and that the net foreign
asset position was far less negative, than had previously been
supposed. In the present study we take the official statistics at
face value and assume that recent figures are not freak outliers
but correctly describe powerful adverse trends that seem to
have become entrenched.
Our conditional projections of the primary balance can-
not be justified scientifically. Econometrics tells us (as it has
told many other researchers) that the income elasticity of
demand for imports in the United States is very high and far
in excess of the foreign income elasticity of demand for U.S.
exports.8 But while it is important to bear this in mind, a
point  of saturation must eventually be reached, and it would
be idle to naively project the results yielded by any estimated
equation five or six years into the future. We aim to be con-
servative, entering figures which, given the growth assump-
tions in the ERP, should commend themselves to most
neutral observers. The main considerations to be born in
mind are: the assumed annual average growth rate during the
next six years (3.3 percent) is somewhat higher than that
actually achieved during the past five (2.8 percent); the
prospect for (non-U.S.) world growth during the next six
years seems if anything less favourable than during the past
five, with Japan mired in a seemingly endless stagnation and
Europe the victim of perverse rules governing fiscal policy;
countries in the rest of the world, not only Japan and China
but also nations in Southeast Asia and Latin America, all have
an urgent need to expand their exports, and many of them
will be prepared to shade their prices in order to raise their
shares of the large, open, and well-organised market for man-
ufactures in the United States. To come down to it, we have
assumed that the primary deficit in the United States, having
risen by 3 percentage points (of GDP) during the last five
years,will deteriorate by a further 1.3 percentage points in the
next five (notwithstanding the faster growth rate), with a fur-
ther small decline thereafter taking it from 4.9 percent at the
end of 2002 to 6.0 percent at the end of 2007 and 6.4 percent
at the end of 2008. Obviously, the deterioration could be
much greater than this.
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NET FOREIGN ASSETS AND INTEREST PAYMENTS
This conditional prediction of the primary balance of pay-
ments carries the implication that the net foreign debt would
rise from about 25 percent of GDP at the end of 2001 to nearly
$8 trillion (60 percent of GDP) in 2008. It is true, as the ERP
points out, that the net outflow of interest, profits, and divi-
dends has recently been close to zero. To understand the
underlying trends, however, it is imperative to split the aggre-
gate measures of stocks and flows into two broad compo-
nents—direct investment and other, “financial,” assets and
liabilities.
Chart 3 shows these two broad categories of (net) asset
stocks expressed as percentages of GDP. The upper line
shows how the net stock of direct investment (valued at mar-
ket prices) has remained relatively close to zero during the
last 20 years and became moderately negative in 2001. It fol-
lows that virtually all the overall deterioration in the net
asset position has taken the form of financial assets—largely
short-term instruments like Treasury bills. At the end of
2001 there was a net financial debt equal to about 22 percent
of GDP.
Chart 4 shows the net flows of income associated with
each broad category of asset. The net flows of income gener-
ated by direct investment have been roughly stable at around
3/4 percent of GDP, notwithstanding that the net stock has
fallen below zero. And the net outflow generated by financial
instruments has drifted down by a roughly equal amount,
notwithstanding the large and growing negative asset position.
The ERP (pp.61–62) observes that:
“. . . the rates of return on U.S. investment abroad were
higher than the returns enjoyed by foreign investors in the
United States”; adding that “Further analysis ...i n d icates that
these differences in rates of return are especially pronounced
for direct investment, and less so for portfolio investment”;
also, “Although debt service became a net transfer from the
United States to the rest of the world in 2002, this debt service
is unlikely to amount to a significant portion of U.S.output in
the foreseeable future.”
The first of the quotations above is undoubtedly true.
Comparison of disaggregated inflows and outflows relative to
the stocks of direct investment that generated them do indeed
show that the rate of return to foreign investors is far below
that of U.S. investors abroad. But a similar disaggregation of
financial investments does not support the second quotation,
which suggests that U.S. investors have earned relatively high
returns even though the differential is smaller than is the case
with direct investment. We will argue here that the inference
in the third quotation from the ERPis likely to prove definitely
incorrect.
Chart 5 shows the quasi-interest rates9 earned on both
financial assets and financial liabilities together with the rate
on three-month Treasury bills. What this chart seems to say,
pace the ERP, is that the return to foreign investors on these
instruments has been rather higher than the return to U.S.
investors. But far more important, it suggests a reason why
Chart 3
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the net outflow has failed to rise much in recent times,
notwithstanding the huge deterioration in the net stock 
position.
Both rates of return have tracked the Treasury bill rate
quite closely, and nearly simultaneously, through the last 20
years. It seems reasonable to hold the fall in the bill rate
responsible for the fall in the quasi-interest rates and hence for
the fact that the outflow of income rose so little. As the chart
shows, the bill rate in the third quarter was well below the
quasi-interest rates on internationally held assets, and it has
since fallen further, to 1.2 percent at the end of 2002.
Our projection assumes that the net stock of direct invest-
ment and the associated net inflow of profits both remain
constant as a share of GDP.We further assume that the change
in the net stock of financial liabilities corresponds with the
overall deficit in the current balance of payments as a whole
and that the rate paid on this stock is exactly equal to the
Treasury bill rate projected in the ERP, which shows a rise to
4.3 percent in 2007 and 2008.Although we have done no more
than mechanically carry across the interest rate assumed in the
ERP, the number they have used seems to be a reasonable one
as,following several years of growth equal to,or slightly above,
that of productive potential, the stance of monetary policy
would likely shift from its present stimulatory stance to one
which is neutral.
These assumptions, all taken together, imply that the net
foreign liabilities of the United States would rise to nearly $8
trillion (60 percent of GDP) in 2008. The net outflow of
income would rise from close to zero in the third quarter of
2002 to $200 to $300 billion or nearly 2 percent of GDP. And
this would generate an overall deficit in the current balance of
payments equal to 8 to 9 percent of GDP.
THE PRIVATE SECTOR
Chart 1 showed how the financial balance of the private sector
moved,during the boom,from its historically normal range of
about 3 to 4 percent of GDP to a wholly unprecedented minus
5.5 percent of GDP in the third quarter of 2000. Since then
there has been a substantial reversion toward the historical
norm, although in the fourth quarter of 2002 it was still 1.1
percent negative, implying that private expenditure at that
point was still higher than private income.We start with a gen-
eral presumption that, looking to the medium term, the pri-
vate balance will continue to recover and eventually move
back into surplus.It helps to disaggregate the total private bal-
ance into the corporate and personal sectors.
The lower half of Chart 6 shows that the corporate sector
has normally been in deficit, with outflows exceeding income
(gross of capital consumption), and therefore has normally
been dependent for funds on external borrowing. By this crite-
rion,there has been nothing unusual about the corporate expe-
rience during the whole period since 1992. Corporations
increased their deficit by a large,but not extraordinary,amount
during the boom and reduced it (again by a large, but not
abnormal, amount) in the subsequent slowdown. The fluctua-
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net lending, which rose a lot during the boom and have since
fallen back.While these corporate flows look quite normal tak-
ing the cycle as a whole, it will be as well to remember, when it
comes to making projections, that corporate debt levels have
been raised to record highs. Chart 7 shows how corporate
indebtedness rose to a record level relative to GDP. This was at
least partly because the corporate sector was borrowing to buy
back equity; corporations taken as a whole have been net pur-
chasers of equity,presumably with the aim of maintaining share
prices and financing stock options.
It was the behaviour of the personal sector that was truly
exceptional. Chart 8 shows how, during the boom, the per-
sonal sector’s financial balance10 became negative to an
unusual extent; and how, since the slow recovery in the econ-
omy began,the sector has remained in heavy deficit.Spending
in recent quarters was below normal (relative to income) by
an amount roughly equal to 5 percent of GDP. And, as Chart
8 also shows, personal expenditure has been financed
throughout the last 10 years by a rise in the flow of net lend-
ing that continued right up to the third quarter of last year.
The Fed has just published a comforting assessment of
the present financial position of households11 that emphasises
that, with interest rates so low, the burden of debt service is
generally quite tolerable. We have no quarrel with the Fed’s
assessment of the present position, but personal expenditure
cannot be financed forever by a growing flow of net lending—
that is, by a continuing rise in the rise in debt. The drastic fall
in interest rates and the extreme ease with which equity in
houses can now be “cashed out”have given a new lease on life
to personal expenditure. But a rise of net lending cannot, by
its very nature, be an abiding motor for growth of the econ-
omy; it can continue for a long time, but it cannot continue
forever. Equity can be cashed out only as so long as it exists;
the process is a once-and-for-all affair.At some stage, perhaps
when interest rates increase, the growth of debt will slow
down so that it rises no faster than income; as that happens,
the flow of net lending must fall from 10 percent of disposable
income at the last reading to perhaps 4 or 5 percent, bringing
a substantial check to the growth of personal expenditure rel-
ative to income and a corresponding reversion of the personal
sector’s financial balance towards its historical norm.
In making the projection of the balances shown in Chart 2,
we have assumed that over the next few years,any return by the
corporate sector to deficit will be more than offset by a signifi-
cant recovery in the personal sector balance. Taking the private
sector as a whole, we have assumed that the financial balance
becomes slightly positive, rising to about 1 percent of GDP
between now and 2008, still far below its long-term average.
Is it conceivable (one must ask oneself) that the private
sector will provide the motor for expansion by plunging
deeply once again into deficit? This seems improbable if only
because of the unusually high level of debt that has already
been incurred by both corporations and the personal sector.
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE BUDGET 
There is no escape from the conclusion that if the primary bal-
ance of payments reaches 6.5 percent of GDP in 2008, if the
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overall balance reaches 8.5 percent, and if the private deficit
moves into moderate surplus, then the general government
deficit12 must, by accounting identity, reach 9 to 10 percent of
GDP—a story of twin deficits with a vengeance. Yet, while in
our exposition we have reached this enormous figure by mak-
ing a logical inference from various other assumptions used to
build the projection, it all fits together well as an economic
story. Deficits in the balance of payments are usually feared
because they have to be financed by external borrowing that
may not be forthcoming on acceptable terms and because for-
eign debts have to be serviced.The argument put forward here
is an entirely different one: that the developing balance of pay-
ments deficit is going to act as a formidable drag on demand.
The present hemorrhage from aggregate demand, at 5 percent
of GDP, is already far in excess of anything that has ever been
experienced before (in modern times), though this is still
being masked by the highly unusual private deficit (implying
private expenditure in excess of income), which is likely to go
further into reverse. The rise in the government’s deficit is no
more than is needed to offset these negative forces.
IMPLICATIONS
The scenario illustrated in Chart 2 surely cannot come to pass.
Insuperable political obstacles would be encountered long
before the government deficit reached 9 percent of GDP, with
its corollary that the government debt would rise by an
amount equal to some 30 percent of GDP compared with
present levels. Moreover, should anything like the one repre-
sented in our baseline projection really happen, the position
then reached would be highly unstable13, with foreign debt so
high, and rising so rapidly, that the economy could be kept
going in later years only by ever larger injections from the
public sector.
So, what gives? In our view, the most likely outcome, par-
ticularly in the early part of the period under review,is simply
that the U.S. economy will not recover properly14 but rather
will enter a long, depressing era of “growth recession” with
increasing unemployment and the ever present risk—with
corporate and personal debt so high—of financial implosion.
There would appear to be only one antidote to this
predicament, that net export demand provides the motor for
sustained growth in the future; U.S. exports must rise faster
than imports by very large amounts and for a long period of
time. Some of the ways in which this might come about are
noted below. Each has its own serious problems, but all of
them encounter one substantial disadvantage: U.S. residents
would have to stop absorbing 5 percent more goods and serv-
ices than they produce, with the corollary that fiscal policy
would have to become tighter than at present, not looser as in
our base projection.
The most congenial solution would be that the rest of the
world somehow manages to expand rapidly and sponta-
neously. Yet this, given present attitudes and institutions, is a
hollow suggestion; it would be madness for the United States
to base its economic strategy on the assumption that it will be
hauled out of stagnation by a discontinuous and autonomous
expansion in foreign parts. At present, not only is the rest of
the world itself locked into stagnation, it is looking to the U.S.
economy to fuel the motor for its own growth.
The classic remedy for chronic external imbalance is, of
course,devaluation.It is not inconceivable that devaluation of
the dollar will come to the rescue,but there is no obvious pol-
icy gesture that the U.S. authorities can now take, with real
short-term interest rates close to zero, which would bring this
about on the huge scale necessary—even if this is what they
wanted to do. Although the dollar has notoriously been weak
against the euro in recent months, the more relevant “broad”
index of the dollar’s value15 has hardly fallen since the begin-
ning of 2002. It seems that surplus countries (e.g. Japan and
China) are accumulating mountainous reserves that they have
been using to prevent any natural rebalancing process from
taking place. It is unclear what, if any, limits there are to this
process.And it is doubtful whether a fall in the dollar,however
large, could in practise generate the required (enormous) rise
in net exports given that the market is so stagnant.
Before signing off, the use by the United States of nonse-
lective tariffs, conditionally under Article 12 of the World
Trade Organization, should be mentioned. It is possible to
imagine circumstances under which recourse to protective
tariffs might be the only way in which the U.S.’s strategic prob-
lem can be solved.
CONCLUSION
This analysis has identified a major strategic predicament for
the U.S.economy.16 The most likely consequences of the mas-
sive and growing leak out of the circular flow of income will
be,given present national and international policies,that there
will be no proper recovery from the recent recession; and that8 STRATEGIC ANALYSIS
this stagnation will eventually have grave consequences for the
rest of the world, which has come to look to the United States
to give it momentum. A number of solutions have been out-
lined,but none of them can be relied upon,and some of them
carry serious disadvantages. At some stage, it will have to be
recognised that a new world solution must be found.
NOTES
1. I am grateful to Alex Izurieta and Claudio Dos Santos for
penetrating comments.
2. Federal Reserve Board’s semiannual monetary policy
report to the Congress before the Committee on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate.
3. See, for instance, Bernanke, B. S., and M. Gertler 1999,
“Monetary Policy and Asset Price Volatility” in New
Challenges for Monetary Policy, proceedings of the sym-
posium sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas
City, Jackson Hole, Wyoming, 77–128.
4. The primary balance of payments is defined as the over-
all balance less net payments abroad of interest, divi-
dends, and profits. It is equal to the balance of trade in
goods and services plus net unilateral transfers.
5. To spell it out,Y = PX + G + X – IM where Y is GNP, G is
government expenditure, X is exports including net
income from abroad, and IM is imports. Deducting taxes
and government transfers, T, from both sides and rear-
ranging,we have the relevant identity Y - T - PX = [G - T]
+ [X - IM].
6. It illustrates, but obviously does not prove, any of these
things; the diagram cannot distinguish between the effect
of the budget on the economy and the effect of the econ-
omy on the budget,and so on.But a careful analysis of the
causal factors at work confirms that the propositions that
follow are correct.
7. A Critical Imbalance in U.S. Trade, the U.S. Balance of
Payments, International Indebtedness, and Economic
Policy. Public Policy Brief No. 23, 1995. Annandale-on-
Hudson, N.Y.: The Levy Economics Institute.
8. The so-called “Houthakker”effect.
9. Obtained crudely by dividing the recorded stock lagged
one period by the recorded flow of payments.
10. This differs from the conventional concept of personal
saving in that income is defined as gross of capital con-
sumption, and expenditure includes capital expenditure.
If the personal sector’s financial balance is negative, this
necessarily implies that there is a net acquisition of debt
or a net realisation (by the sector as a whole) of assets.
11. “Recent Changes in U.S. Family Finances: Evidence from
the 1998 and 2001 Survey of Consumer Finances.”Federal
Reserve Bulletin, January 2003.
12. There are differences (definitions, timing, and coverage)
between the deficit of the general government, which we
are tracking here, and that of the federal government, but
these pale into insignificance, given the huge figure we
now tussle with.
13. On the assumptions used, the situation is not formally
unstable since real interest rates are below the growth
rate. The foreign debt would eventually stabilise at about
five times GDP and the balance of payments deficit at
about 15 percent—hardly an appetising prospect.
14. Assuming that geopolitical developments do not give rise
to military expenditure on a scale far larger than anything
so far indicated.
15. The Fed’s broad trade-weighted index,corrected for infla-
tion.
16. All the conclusions depend on the assumption that the
official figures are broadly correct.THE LEVY ECONOMICS INSTITUTE OF BARD COLLEGE   9
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